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ABSTRACT: Boran Berčić, in the second volume of his recent book Filozofija 
(2012), offers two responses to David Chalmers’s conceivability or modal ar-
gument against physicalism. This latter argument aims at showing that zombies, 
our physical duplicates who lack consciousness, are metaphysically possible, 
given that they are conceivable. Berčić’s first response is based on the principle 
of the uniformity of nature that states that causes of a certain type will always 
cause effects of the same type. His second response is based on the assumption 
that the basic statements of physicalism in philosophy of mind are or should 
be contingently true. I argue that if Berčić’s first defence is aimed at the con-
ceivability of zombies, it is unsatisfactory. Moreover, I argue that a quite simi-
lar argument, offered by John Perry in his book Knowledge, Possibility and 
Consciousness (2001), is afflicted by a similar problem. Nevertheless, under a 
more plausible interpretation, Berčić’s argument might be taken to attack the 
metaphysical possibility of zombies. This version of the argument might be 
effective and has the merit to point out a so far overlooked link between the 
discussion of the Chalmers’s conceivability arguments against physicalism and 
the modal strength of causal links and natural laws. Then, I argue that Berčić’s 
second defence of physicalism, which cannot be combined consistently with 
his first one, in any case, should not be formulated in the terms of contingent 
physicalism.
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1. Introduction
Physicalists or materialists in philosophy of mind think that mental states 
and properties are respectively identical to physical states and properties or 
depend on physical states and properties in ways that confers to the latter 
an ontological “primacy”.1 However, there are certain persistent intuitions, 
then refined or articulated in philosophical arguments, for the conclusion 
that conscious experiences involve properties, usually called qualia, that 
cannot have a place in the physical or natural world. Qualia are taken to be 
features of our conscious mental states, usually conscious experience as 
those involved in having pain or perceiving the world. Qualia are taken to 
characterise the specific ways a subject enjoy having these mental states. 
For instance, the specific way in which the taste of Malvasia is given to 
you, when you drink it, involves qualia that characterise the way in which 
you undergo the conscious gustatory experience of that wine.
A class of arguments, known as modal arguments, has been advanced 
for the conclusion that qualia cannot have a place in the physical world. 
These arguments rely on the idea of the philosophical zombie.2 A philo-
sophical zombie (zombie, from now on) is a hypothetical creature who 
is a duplicate of you or me in terms of physical composition, but who 
lacks qualia. The modal arguments move from the conceivability of zom-
bie worlds, that are physical duplicates of our world that contain zombies, 
to derive their metaphysical possibility, and this is then taken to threaten 
physicalism.
Boran Berčić has recently argued, in the second volume of his book 
Filozofija, that there are two defensive barriers between physicalism and 
the modal argument based on zombies.3 His first response is based on the 
principle of the uniformity of nature that states that causes of a certain 
type will always cause effects of the same type. Berčić’s second response 
is based on the assumption that the basic statements of physicalism in 
philosophy of mind are or should be contingently true.
In this paper, I argue that Berčić’s first defence is unsatisfactory, if he 
intends to attack with it the thesis that zombies are conceivable. Moreover, 
I will argue that a quite similar argument, offered by John Perry in his 
book Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness (2001) is afflicted by a 
similar problem. However, I show that, under another plausible interpreta-
tion, Berčić’s first defence might be taken to attack the thesis that zombies 
1 Supervenience is the main notion used to spell out this dependence, see McLaughlin 
and Bennett (2011). 
2 Kripke (1971), Chalmers (1996). For an introduction to the zombie arguments and 
the debate on them, see Kirk (2011).
3 Berčić (2012: 179–184).
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are metaphysically possible. This argument is more plausible and it has 
the merit to point out a link between the discussion of the conceivability 
arguments against physicalism and the modal strength of causal links and 
of natural laws. This is an important connection that surprisingly has been 
addressed, independently, by very few contemporary authors.4 I then will 
argue that Berčić’s second defence of physicalism, which cannot be com-
bined consistently with his first one, in any case, should not be formulated 
as he does in terms of contingent a posteriori physicalism. Without pre-
tending to offer a definitive argument, I will rehearse some of the consid-
erations that have induced many physicalists to think that the fundamental 
statements of their view are, although a posteriori, metaphysically neces-
sary and not contingent.
I will proceed as follows. In section 2, I present Chalmers’s conceiv-
ability argument and my interpretation of Berčić’s argument from the uni-
formity of nature. I argue that neither this defence of physicalism nor a 
similar advanced by Perry are successful. In section 3, I set out and discuss 
the merits of a different reading of Berčić’s argument from the uniformity 
of nature. In section 4, I consider Berčić’s second response to the modal 
argument and briefly explain why many physicalists prefer not to endorse 
contingent physicalism.
2. The uniformity of nature and the 
conceivability of zombies
Berčić’s defends physicalism from a formulation of the modal argument 
offered by David Chalmers.5 This argument goes as follows:
1. In our world there are conscious experiences.
2. There is a logically possible world physically identical to ours, in 
which the positive facts about our consciousness do not hold.
3. Therefore, facts about consciousness are further facts about or 
world, over and above the physical facts.
4. So materialism is false. (Chalmers 1996: 123)
I take that the core of Berčić’s first response to Chalmers’s modal 
argument is contained in the following passage:
The intuition about the uniformity of nature––that the same causes always 
lead to the same outcomes––is in direct contradiction with the second step in 
Chalmers’s argument. If the same causes always lead to equal effects, then 
4 I am only aware of Garrett (2009).
5 Berčić (2012: 180).
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it is simply not possible a world that is the same as our physical world and 
where there is no conscious life. (Berčić 2012: 181–182) 6
In this passage, it is explicitly stated that the target of the response is 
premise 2 of Chalmers’s argument. However, it seems that before discuss-
ing Berčić’s argument we should carefully consider its aim.
Berčić’s intention is expressed in the text that precedes his argument, 
where he states the main question that he wants to answer:
Can I really conceive a being who has no mental states although is physi-
cally exactly like me? … (Berčić 2012: 181) 7
Berčić talks about conceivability (zamislivost). Thus, we might assume 
that his argument is directed against the conceivability of zombies. So, it 
is surely worth considering what we should take conceivability to be.
Conceivability is an epistemic notion taken to concern what we can 
find coherent a priori by using our concepts. In particular, we can say that 
S is conceivable when it expresses a certain hypothesis, that, in a posi-
tion of ideal reflection, we cannot a priori rule out. So, the conclusion 
of Berčić’s argument, under the interpretation suggested above, is that in 
thinking in an ideal reflective position about the physical story P and the 
phenomenal fact Q, we would find out a priori that P and not-Q is incoher-
ent. This means that a zombie world should be ruled out just by reflecting 
on the issue by employing the concepts involved in thinking about P and 
Q. So, let thus formulate Berčić’s argument accordingly.
It seems that a central premise in Berčić’s argument is the following 
formulation of the principle of the uniformity of nature.
If an instantiation of type A causes an instantiation of type B, then, ceteris 
paribus, any instantiation of type A causes an instantiation of type B.
6 All the translations from Croatian are mine. The original is: “Intuicija o unifor-
mnosti prirode – da jednaki uzroci uvijek dovode do jednakih posljedica – u direktnoj je 
kontradikciji s drugim korakom u Chalmersovom argumentu. Ako jednaki uzroci uvijek 
dovode do jednakih posljedica, onda naprosto nije moguć svijet fizički identičan našem u 
kojem nema nikakvog svjesnog života.” (Berčić 2012: 181–182).
7 In the original: “Mogu li doista zamisliti biće koje nema nikavih mentalnih stanja 
iako je fizički potpuno jednako mojemu? … Ako su sva fizička svojstva dvaju bića potpuno 
jednaka, onda i sva ostala svojstva, uključjući i mentalna, moraju biti potpuno jednaka! Da 
bi biće slično meni moglo ne imati nikakva mentalna stanja a da ja imam ta koja imam, 
mora postojati nekakva fizička razlika u moždanim stanjima. Ako nema nikakve fizičke 
razlike, ne može biti niti bilo koje druge razlike. Dakle, mi možemo zamisliti zombija 
sličnog nama, ali nije jasno kako bismo mogli zamisliti zombija do posljednjeg neurona 
jednakog nama. Ako ne možemo, to bi značilo da zapravo nije moguće zamisliti zombija”. 
(Berčić 2012: 181) 
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The expression “ceteris paribus” means that all other conditions have to 
be equal or held constant. In the requirement in the principle above the 
expression means that all other relevant conditions that obtain when the 
instantiation of type A causes an instantiation of type B have always to ob-
tain for the other instantiations of A to cause instantiations of B.8 For simpli-
city’s sake, in the following uses of the principle of uniformity of nature I 
will drop the ceteris paribus clause and the specification that the principle 
concerns repeatable instantiations of a certain type. Let us now introduce 
some further notation that is useful to present Berčić’s argument.
Let us assume that P is the physical story about our world. P is a con-
junction of all the microphysical truths about the universe. Specifically, 
P can be the (possible or future) complete physical story about our world 
that also includes functional properties specified in terms of causal roles.9 
So, physicalists would think that the story P would be enough to describe 
and explain qualia or at least to describe what ontologically “fixes” their 
occurrences.
In addition, let us assume that Q is a fact involving the instantiation of 
a quale in our world, for example the fact of having pain or a certain quali-
tative feature. Now, (P and not Q) is the description of a zombie world. 
This is a world that is physically identical to our world but that contains 
zombies, our physical duplicates that lack qualia.
If we assume that Berčić’s argument supports the conclusion that 
zombie worlds are inconceivable, we could formulate it as follows.10
1. If the instantiation of P causes the instantiation of Q, then always 
instantiations of P would cause an instantiation of Q. (Uniformity 
of nature applied to P and Q)
2. An instantiation of P causes an instantiation of Q. (Physical to 
mental causation)
3. A priori we know that P is instantiated in the zombie world. (By 
hypothesis)
8 Given that the issue is not relevant in the following discussion, no commitment is 
here needed about the relata of casual relations and thus about what kind of entities are 
these instantiations.
9 If you worry about the intelligibility of any reasoning whose premises include P, 
you are not alone. There is an increasing awareness amongst philosophers of mind that 
something substantial should be said about the proper understanding of what is meant by 
“physical” in many arguments for or against physicalism. For an introduction to the con-
temporary debate on this issue, see Montero (2009). For a more opinionated treatment, see 
Stoljar (2010). My attempt to contribute to this debate is Malatesti (2008).
10 The assumption that events are the entities that satisfy P and Q and are causal re-
lata is made for expository reasons, without any commitment on ontological issues about 
causation.
250 Prolegomena 12 (2) 2013
4. A priori we know that an instantiation P causes an instantiation of 
Q in the zombie world. (From 1 and 2).
5. A priori we can rule out (P and not-Q). (From 4)
Therefore:
6. It is not conceivable (P and not-Q). (From 4 and 5)
This argument, if effective, would even defend forms of a priori 
physicalism from modal arguments based on zombies. According to these 
versions of physicalism, in an ideal reflective position, we would know 
a priori that (P entails Q) and thus that zombie worlds are inconceivable. 
There are several physicalists that endorse this doctrine, usually by main-
taining that an analysis of our mental concepts would reveal the complete 
physical story P would entail the instantiation of Q.11
However, this reading of Berčić’s argument give us an invalid ar-
gument. In fact proposition 4 does not follow logically from premises 1 
and 2 given that they are a posteriori, and they should be both a priori.12 
Although Berčić does not say so, it can be conceded to him that we know 
a priori the principle of the uniformity of nature and its specific instance 
in premise 1. However, we cannot know a priori the content of premise 2 
that states that an instance of P causes that of Q in our world. In fact there 
is no a priori accessible logical contradiction in thinking that P might not 
have caused Q or whichever of its effects. In particular, we have to remind 
ourselves that, in order not to beg the question with dualism, Berčić can-
not assume the truth of physicalism in his argument. Moreover, a fortiori, 
he cannot assume the truth of a priori physicalism, according to which it is 
a priori that (P entails Q). This would be a premise that might, somehow, 
ground the conclusion that we know a priori that P causes Q. So, it seems 
that if Berčić’s target is the conceivability of zombies, the suggested inter-
pretation of his argument is not effective.
Interestingly, John Perry has attempted to deny the conceivability of 
zombie worlds by considering the physical effects of the instantiation of 
Q, instead than its physical causal antecedents as in Berčić’s argument.13 
According to Perry, given that by hypothesis Q is not instantiated in the, 
alleged, zombie world; it would follow that also the physical effects of the 
instantiation of Q will not be instantiated in it. However, this would mean 
that the world where Q is not instated will diverge, in a physical way, from 
11 For endorsements of a priori physicalism, see Shoemaker (1980) and Dennett 
(2007). It has been also argued that if physicalism is true, it as to be a priori physicalism, 
see for instance Jackson (2007). For a response, see McLaughlin (2007).
12 In fact, if we know a priori that (p then q) we cannot derive that we know a priori 
that q, if we do not know a priori that p.
13 Perry (2001: 72–89).
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our world. Thus, the complete physical story P of our world could not be 
instantiated in that other world. Therefore, Perry concludes that that world 
cannot be a zombie world.
Perry, then, maintains that his argument shows that the real issue 
raised by the modal argument based on zombies is the opposition between 
epiphenomenalism and interactionism and not that between dualism and 
physicalism. However, also Perry’s argument appears to be trading on the 
questionable assumption that a posteriori truths about our physical world 
should determine what can be ruled out a priori and, thus, what we cannot 
conceive.14
To recapitulate, two attempts at undermining the conceivability of 
zombies do not succeed. The reason is that, in trying to downgrade the 
conceivability of zombies to a form of prima facie conceivability, these 
reasonings have to rely on a posteriori theses about our world. However, 
Berčić’s central intuition that the uniformity of nature can be used to resist 
the modal argument based on zombies can be shaped in a different and 
more successful way.
3. The uniformity of nature against the metaphysical 
possibility of zombies
It is useful to present Chalmers’s modal argument in a now standard for-
mulation that makes explicit some premises that are left implicit in the 
version that has been addressed by Berčić.15
Chalmers’s now standard formulation of the modal argument that is 
also known as conceivability argument goes as follows.16
1. P and not-Q is conceivable.
2. If P and not-Q is conceivable, P and not-Q is metaphysically pos-
sible.
3. If P and not-Q is metaphysically possible, materialism is false.
Therefore:
4. Materialism is false.
Let us clarify the premises.
The notion of conceivability in the first premise is the epistemic no-
tion that I have presented in the previous section. On the other hand, the 
14 See for this line of argument, Chalmers (2009).
15 See Chalmers (2009). To be precise, this is the schematic structure of Chalmers’s 
argument, given that his more fine grained distinctions between different types of conceiv-
ability and possibility are not made here explicit.
16 Chalmers (2009: 314).
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notion of metaphysical possibility in the second premise is an ontological 
notion that is taken to depend on what follows from the nature or from the 
essence of the entities concerned. Specifically, we can say that the sen-
tence S is metaphysically possible when its falsity does not follow from 
the nature or essence of the entities that are involved in its truth-maker. 
Thus, the second premise states the existence of an inferential connection 
between the epistemic realm of what we find conceivable, to the ontologi-
cal realm of what is metaphysically possible.
Finally, the third premise of the argument concerns an ontological 
consequence of endorsing physicalism or materialism. This is the claim 
that physicalists have to accept that from their position follows that the 
fundamental psychophysical relation between mental and physical prop-
erties, being an identity or some other relation of ontological dependency, 
has to be metaphysically necessary. While I will discuss this premise of the 
conceivability argument in section 4, here I consider its second premise.
Berčić’s argument from the uniformity of nature can be directed 
against the thesis that if P and not-Q is conceivable, then P and not-Q is 
metaphysically possible. The aim of response would be to offer an non-
question begging counterexample by showing that, independently form 
the assumption of physicalism, although the zombie world is even ide-
ally conceivable, it is nonetheless metaphysically impossible. Let us begin 
with a formulation that exploits the principle of uniformity of nature, as 
presented by Berčić:
1. If the instantiation of P causes an instantiation of Q, then always 
instantiations of P would cause an instantiation of Q. (Uniformity 
of nature applied to P and Q)
2. An instantiation of P causes an instantiation of Q. (Physical to 
mental causation)
3. There is an instantiation of P in the zombie world. (By hypoth-
esis)
4. It is metaphysically necessary that an instantiation P causes an 
instantiation of Q. (From 1 and 2)
5. It is metaphysically necessary not (P and not-Q). (From 4)
Therefore:
6. It is metaphysically impossible (P and not-Q). (From 3 and 5)
It seems that also this formulation is not valid. Neither the instance of 
the principle of uniformity of nature nor the fact that P causes Q are stated 
as being metaphysically necessary. However, this is a requirement for the 
derivation of thesis 4 from these premises. Let us see whether a reformula-
tion of the principle of the uniformity of nature can help here.
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Berčić does not state explicitly the modal force of the principle of the 
uniformity of nature used in his argument. Nevertheless, it is plausible to 
assume that it involves implicitly a modal operator of necessity.17 Specifi-
cally, I would suggest that the principle of uniformity of nature, to be used 
in the argument against the metaphysical possibility of zombies, should 
involve a metaphysically necessary consequent. Thus, the principle could 
be states as:
If the instantiation of P causes an instantiation of Q, then it is metaphysically 
necessary that always instantiations of P would cause an instantiation of Q. 
(Strong uniformity of nature applied to P and Q)
Thus, we have a third formulation of Berčić’s argument:
1. If the instantiation of P causes an instantiation of Q, then it is met-
aphysically necessary that always events P would cause an instan-
tiation of Q. (Strong uniformity of nature applied to P and Q)
2. An instantiation of P causes an instantiation of Q. (Physical to 
mental causation)
3. There is an instantiation of P in the zombie world. (By hypothesis)
4. It is metaphysically necessary that the instantiation of P causes an 
instantiation of Q. (From 1 and 2)
5. It is metaphysically necessary not (P and not-Q). (From 4)
Therefore:
6. It is metaphysically impossible (P and not-Q). (From 3 and 5)
Let us now evaluate the argument.
The argument appears to be formally valid. In addition it is not beg-
ging any question for the majority of dualists. The principle of uniformity 
of nature could be endorsed also by dualists or even idealists as a principle 
that regulates whatever causal relations they are ready to endorse. In addi-
tion, the specific application of this principle to the argument against the 
possibility of zombies is based on the assumption that the instantiation 
of P causes the instantiation of Q in our world. Also this premise does 
not beg any questions for the majority of dualists. In fact, many dualists 
are epiphenomenalists, if not interactionists, and, thus, recognise, at least, 
physical to mental causal relations.
However, some dualists, who are not willing to question the principle 
of uniformity of nature, might deny that physical states cause Q. Thus, 
they would support, for example, parallelism or mental to physical only 
interactionism. Regardless the issue of the plausibility of these latter doc-
17 Moreover, in a personal communication, Berčić explained me that this is how he 
understands the principle of uniformity of nature.
254 Prolegomena 12 (2) 2013
trines, it would in any case follow that the conceivability argument based 
on zombies does not do the job it was meant to do by its proponents. In-
stead of supporting dualism, it would become an argument for supporting 
the denial of physical to mental causal relations. Thus, Berčić’s argument 
is valid and it is not question begging. However, we have to see whether 
its premises are true. Clearly, the modally strong version of the uniformity 
principle calls for our attention.
The principle of uniformity of nature, especially when the cause is the 
complete physical story P, and thus with all the ceteris paribus conditions 
in their place, might appear to be tenable here. However, it is important 
to recognise that Berčić, in order to block the metaphysical possibility of 
zombies, needs to state it in a quite strong modal form.18 Now, the prob-
lem of spelling out the modal strength of the principle of uniformity of 
nature and of the laws of nature in general has been widely discussed in 
metaphysics, and in philosophy of science. Starting from David Hume, 
empiricists have argued that empirical evidence can only support a “regu-
larity account” of laws of nature and causation. According to this doctrine, 
the uniformities of nature are only regularities that have no kind of strong 
necessitation.19 However, others, such as Sydney Shoemaker for instance, 
have advanced the stronger requirement that they involve metaphysical 
necessity.20 Without adjudicating the issue here, it is important to stress 
that Berčić’s argument bridges the debate on zombies with this one con-
cerning the modality of the principle of the uniformity of nature. Thus, he 
reveals that the metaphysical possibility of zombies depends on the issue 
of how modally strong is the “causal cement” of the universe.
However, let me also qualify the extent of Berčić’s result in relation 
of the debate on the conceivability argument. First, it has to be acknowl-
edge that offering a counterexample to a thesis, although it might show 
that the thesis is false, it does not show why it is false. In addition, it is fair 
to say that an independent argument for the thesis that, at least in the case 
of qualia, what we can conceive is a guide to its metaphysical possibility 
is a central part of the principal modal arguments against physicalism, that 
have been advanced by Kripke and Chalmers. These defences have, in one 
way or the other, traded on the special first personal access that we sup-
posedly have to qualia. This access confers us a special authority to grasp 
the essential nature of these properties. This authority, by being in turn 
18 In a personal communication, Berčić told me that he defends also the stronger claim 
that it is metaphysically necessary that P causes Q. However, this strong determinism is 
not required by my formulation of Berčić’s argument from the uniformity of nature.
19 A classical empiricist account of the uniformities of nature is offered in Hempel 
and Oppenheim (1948).
20 Shoemaker (1998).
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embedded in our mastery of the concepts about qualia used in conceiving 
zombies, guarantees that zombies are metaphysically possible.21
On the other hand, physicalists have offered arguments aimed at un-
dermining this special access. In particular, many discuss about the nature 
of the concepts that we use to think, from the first person, about qualia to 
determine whether or not there is such a special access that would justify 
the second premise of the conceivability argument. 22 Berčić does not en-
gage directly with these recent debates; however he addresses a central 
tenet for many physicalists engaged in the discussion. This is the thesis 
that the basic statements of the physicalist position are a posteriori. So, 
let us now move to the second family of considerations that Berčić has 
advanced to resist the modal arguments against physicalism.
4. Contingent physicalism
Berčić thinks that the physicalists have another line of defence against the 
argument from conceivability: they should maintain that physicalism is 
contingently true. This line of reasoning goes as follows:
Even if the mental and physical are not the same, this does not follow from 
the intuition that it is logically possible that the mental and physical are not 
the same. The logical possibility that the mental and the physical are not 
the same is not sufficient to show that the mental and the physical de facto 
are not the same. For this reason the physicalists have insisted on the thesis 
that the identity between the physical and the mental is a contingent iden-
tity, which is established by a posteriori scientific investigation rather than 
a priori philosophical argument. Just as no amount of a priori philosophical 
reasoning can establish whether or not a professor of ethics in the Faculty 
of Arts is the Dean of the Faculty, no amount of a priori philosophical rea-
soning can say whether or not mental states are physical states of the brain. 
(Berčić 2012: 183–184)23
21 Kripke (1971), Chalmers (2009). Notoriously, Descartes, in his argument from 
clear and distinct perception in the Meditations (Descartes 1641 (1996)), relied on the 
goodness of God to bridge the transition from his clearly and distinctly conceiving a dis-
tinction between his mind and his body to their possible difference.
22 See Alter and Walter (2007).
23 In the original: “Čak i da mentalno i fizičko nisu isto, to ne slijedi iz intuicije da je 
logički moguće da mentalno i fizičko nisu isto. Logička mogućnost da mentalno i fizičko 
nisu isto nije dovoljna da bi se pokazalo da mentalno i fizičko de facto nisu isto. Upravo 
su zbog toga fizikalisti inzistirali na tezi da identitet između fizičkog i mentalnog jest 
kontingentni identitet kojega se utvrđuje aposteriornim znanstvenim istraživanjem a ne 
apriornom filozofskom argumentacijom. Isto kao što nikakva količina apriorne filozofske 
argumentacije ne može reći da li profesor etike na Filozofskom fakultetu jest Dekan tog 
Fakulteta ili nije, isto nam tako nikakva količina apriorne filozofske argumentacije ne može 
reći da li mentalna stanja jesu fizička stanja mozga ili nisu.” (Berčić 2012: 183–184).
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The contingency of the basic physicalist claims can be traced back to the 
identity theory that was advanced by U.T. Place and J.J.C Smart in the 
first half of the twentieth century.24 The core claim of this position was 
that each type of conscious experience and its properties are contingently 
identical, respectively, to a type of physical, neural, state and its physical 
properties. Thus, if we take qualia to be properties of experiences, and 
remind ourselves that P contains a complete story about the brain of the 
relevant subject, Q, by being contingently identical to some physical fact 
described in P, will be entailed, contingently, by P.
The upholders of identity theory maintained that the psychophysi-
cal identities of types of conscious experiences with types of brain states 
were contingent, such as other identities discovered by science. So, they 
maintained that, as we have discovered the contingent identity between 
water and H2O, there were good reasons for believing that neuroscience 
would have one day discovered the type of neural state to which a certain 
conscious experience, say a pain in your elbow, would be contingently 
identical. Such a discovery would be, of course, a posteriori.
These philosophers, besides pointing to the reasons for expecting, in 
general, that discoveries of contingent psychophysical identities were pos-
sible and probable, embarked also in the philosophical task of showing 
that there were no a priori reasons for thinking that such discoveries were 
impossible. This latter task was carried forward by dismantling one by one 
several a priori objections to the possibility of discovering psychophysi-
cal contingent identities.25 Given the adherence of these physicalists to the 
analytic paradigm of their time, the majority of these rebuttals involved 
focussing on the supposed linguistic and semantic wrong turns taken by 
their opponents. The core of this detailed defensive manoeuvring was the 
idea that although a priori it was possible to conceive that psychophysi-
cal identities are impossible, in our reformulation of the issue that (P and 
not Q) is metaphysically possible and thus that (P does not entail Q), this 
was not damaging to the assumption that these identities were contingent. 
Consider someone who would like to dismiss the identity of water with 
H2O by maintaining that we can conceive that it is possible that water is 
not H2O.
So, Berčić, at least on this respect, bring us back to the origins of 
physicalism in the analytic philosophy of mind.26 It is important to stress 
that he offers contingent physicalism as a second line of defence from the 
modal argument that is independent from his argument from the uniform-
24 Place (1956) and Smart (1959).
25 A rather detailed defensive work was carried forward in Smart (1959).
26 However, Berčić does not endorse type to type psychophysical identities.
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ity of nature. Moreover, these two defences should be independent. In 
fact, the physicalist that endorses the metaphysically strong version of 
the principle of uniformity of nature has to conclude that her position is 
incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of zombies. Thus, the ba-
sic psychophysical identifications in his doctrine (or the other relations of 
non symmetric dependence between physical properties and mental prop-
erties) have to be necessary. In any case, what Berčić needs from these 
earlier versions of physicalism is just the epistemic tenet that the basic 
physicalist theses are a posteriori. Thus, the conceivability of zombies, 
once proved their impossibility, would not be a problem for a posteriori 
necessary physicalism.
However, it might be worth exploring an important issue that is left 
out from Berčić’s treatment of the conceivability argument. At least in 
contemporary philosophy of mind, modal arguments come with sub-argu-
ments to debunk the physicalists from contingent physicalism and force 
them to endorse modally stronger theses. This, of course, is done to render 
the physicalist’s position vulnerable to the conceivability arguments. In 
particular, Kripke has famously argued for the conclusion that physicalist 
should embrace necessitation physicalism.27 The central background of 
Kripke’s modal argument against type-type identity theory was his argu-
ment that psychophysical identities cannot be contingent. First, thanks to 
his celebrated idea that the epistemic distinction between a priori and a 
posteriori and the ontological distinction between necessary and contin-
gent are orthogonal, Kripke could maintain that the assumption that these 
identities can be discovered a posteriori is not guarantee of their contin-
gency. Second, by arguing that psychophysical identities are expressible 
by means of rigid designators, that are terms who refer to the same entity 
in every possible world (where that entity exists), he could conclude that 
these identity have to be necessary; the central idea here being that an 
entity is necessarily identical to itself.
5. Conclusion
To recap, I have discussed Berčić’s response to the modal argument based 
on the principle of the uniformity of nature. I have stressed that his rea-
soning can be shaped as a very interesting and, so far, not sufficiently 
explored line of thought. I have also argued that it even might work, if it is 
based on a modally strong principle of the uniformity of nature. However, 
establishing the plausibility of this principle would lead us directly into 
27 Kripke (1971).
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the debate of the modal strength of the principles that regulate causation 
and the natural world.
In addition, I have argued that Berčić cannot couple the argument 
from the uniformity of nature with contingent a posteriori physicalism. 
First, this position is not compatible with the recommended strong modal 
reading of his argument from uniformity. Second, it is not a good alter-
native response to the modal argument. In fact, it is part of the tradition 
of the conceivability arguments, at least from Kripke on, to offer quite 
strong considerations for the endorsement of modally necessary forms of 
physicalism. Anyway, it seems that Smart and Place’s relevant legacy for 
Berčić is that the specific psychophysical relations endorsed by physical-
ists, identities or more relaxed ontological dependencies, are to be discov-
ered a posteriori.
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